Most clearly, what Marcuse wants to preserve and defend in Hegel is the central place given in his system to "negativity," the "power" of thought and action to reject and transform any putative "positive" reality, and the impossibility of understanding any such reality except in relation to this possibility. Accordingly, in Reason and Revolution, he again rejects in Hegel all those aspects of his thought that tend to suppress or overcome this negating potential . . . (1988, p. 82). Marcuse discusses more briefly the third and final book of Hegel's Science of Logic, the Doctrine of the Notion or concept, but this discussion is notable for its rather unusual focus on "a rough interpretation of its closing paragraphs" (1941, p. 161). Marcuse devotes seven pages to these closing paragraphs, stating that "Hegel's chapter on the Absolute Idea gives us a final comprehensive demonstration of dialectic method," and that even the Absolute Idea "is dialectical thought and thus contains its negation; it is not a harmonious and stable form but a process of unification of opposites" (1941, p. 165).
Pippin implies further that this rejection is due at least in part to
At the same time, however, Marcuse writes that in its closing paragraphs "Hegel's Logic resumes the metaphysical tradition of Western philosophy, a tradition that it had abandoned in so many of its aspects" (1941, p. 166). This is because "the basic concepts of idealism reflect a social separation of the intellectual sphere from the sphere of material production. ..." Such a separation exists in a situation where "a 'leisure class' became the guardian of the idea by virtue of the fact that it was not compelled to work for the material reproduction of society" (1941, p. 163). Marcuse holds that although Hegel attempts to go beyond this traditional type of idealism, he is ultimately unsuccessful. According to Marcuse, then, Hegel's Absolute Idea moves out of history and negativity and toward a purely ontological position. He also points to what he considers to be the theological aspects of the Absolute Idea, as "the Christian tradition, in which Hegel's philosophy was deeply rooted, asserts its right" (1941, p. 167). In this connection Marcuse quotes a passage in which Hegel asserts that his concept of logic "shows forth God as he is in his eternal essence" (1941, p. 167). Yet this passage which Marcuse cites is not from the conclusion, but from the introduction, to the Science of Logic. Very few direct references to God or religion can be found in the Absolute Idea chapter of the Science of Logic, as noted by Lenin, an earlier Marxist reader:
It is noteworthy that the whole chapter on the "Absolute Idea" scarcely says a word about God . . . it contains almost nothing that is specifically idealism, but has for its main subject the dialectical method ([1914-15] 1961, p. 234).
In a somewhat similar vein, but not moving as far as Lenin in rejecting religious roots for Hegel's Absolute Idea, Marcuse nonetheless regards Hegel's Absolute Idea as seeking to "prove its freedom by freely releasing itself into otherness, that is, nature" (1941, p. 167). In this sense he seems to view the conclusion of the Science of Logic as less of a closure than the end of the Phenomenology.
In the text of Hegel's Science of Logic, in fact, Hegel writes in the last paragraph that the Idea engages in a process whereby it "freely releases itself" in part in a relationship to Nature (Hegel [1831] 1969, p. 843) . To Marcuse this statement shows the "rationalistic tendencies" (1941, p. 167) in Hegel's philosophy, even where Marcuse sees (at least to some degree) a move to theology as well. Through this free release into Nature, Hegel has made a transition to the world of material reality, which takes us eventually to human praxis and history. Marcuse writes that Nature, for Hegel, is the transition to history, where the "identity of subject and object" is "attained" (1941, p. 168 Resuming a step-by-step discussion of Marcuse's text, we see that Marcuse does move from Hegel's Science of Logic to a discussion of his political philosophy. In this discussion, Marcuse criticizes Hegel's political philosophy and his philosophy of history, and he regards Hegel's concept of negation of the negation, rather than Hegel's specific writings on history and politics, as the principal link to Marx. According to Marcuse, Hegel's appointment to the leading chair in philosophy at the University of Berlin in 1817 marked "the end of his philosophical development" at the very time when he became "the philosophical dictator of Germany" as the "so-called official philosopher of the Prussian state" (1941, p. 169). In this period Hegel composed his Philosophy of Right, a work that expresses "the underlying identity of social and economic relations" of "middle class society" (1941, p. 172). Thus Hegel wanted a powerful bureauracy to create a stronger foundation for the new social order "than the interests of relatively small providers can provide" (1941, p. 176). Even so, writes Marcuse, Hegel's determined opposition to J.F. Fries's antigovernment German youth movement must be seen in the context of that movement's anti-Semitism and concern with "the Teutonic race alone" (1941, p. 179); Marcuse regards this movement as a precursor of fascism. At the same time, Hegel's state was to be "governed by the standards of critical reason and universally valid laws" and thus was "a weapon against reaction" (1941, p. 180).
In working out the analysis of social relations, however, Hegel's philosophy of the state "loses its critical content and comes to serve as a metaphysical justification of private property" (1941, p. 189). According to Marcuse, this is the case because the "authoritarian trend that appears in Hegel's political philosophy is made necessary by the antagonistic structure of civil society" (1941, p. 202) a society divided into classes. In Hegel's schema, three institutions-the police, the corporations, and the state itself-are to help alleviate and reconcile class conflict. This philosophy is hardly radical or even democratic, but rather is bound to the authoritarian and underdeveloped conditions of Germany in the 1820s. Marcuse The revolution requires the maturity of many forces, but the greatest among them is the subjective force, namely the revolutionary class itself. The realization of freedom requires the free rationality of those who achieve it (Marcuse 1941, p. 319).
In this sense, the class is to be armed intellectually with the concept of dialectical Reason developed by Hegel and Marx. Marcuse's discussion of Marx, however, concludes on a more sanguine note, stressing the persistence of radical theory even in the face of a blocked objective situation: "Theory will preserve the truth even if revolutionary practice deviates from its proper path. Practice follows the truth, not vice versa" (1941, p. 322). In this passage, which concludes his discussion of Marx, Marcuse's stance is substantially similar to that of his Frankfurt School colleagues.
To Marcuse, positivism represents a theoretical counterrevolution against the heritage of Hegel and Marx. He writes (1941, p. 340) that Comte's attempt to found "an independent science of sociology" is made at the price of "renouncing the transcendent point of view of the philosophical critique," especially the negative and critical stance toward the world found in German philosophy. Comte viewed himself as focusing on "useful knowledge"-that is, knowledge useful to ruling elites-"instead of negation and destruction" (1941, p. 341). Further:
Rarely in the past has any philosophy urged itself forward with so strong and so overt a recommendation that it be utilized for the maintenance of prevailing authority and for the protection of vested interest from any and all revolutionary onset (1941, p. 345).
The problem is not that positivism "excluded reform and change" but rather that change was to take place as "part of the machinery of the given order" (1941, p. 348). Throughout, Marcuse sharply contrasts Comte's "positive philosophy" with the "negative philosophy" not only of Marx, but also of Hegel. He also discusses some conservative German positivists, but he does not connect this critique to contemporary positivists or pragmatists or to the work of other major figures such as Durkheim. Marcuse critiques pragmatism in some of his writings in German for the Frankfurt School's own Zeitschrift fir Sozialfor-schung (Kellner 1984 ), but he does not do so in English during this period. This reticence may have had some connection with the precarious position of an emigre scholar.
Marcuse also defends Hegel against charges, still common even today in the Englishspeaking world, that Hegel's thought is somehow the forerunner of fascism and totalitarianism. Marcuse argues that Nazi ideologists, far from embracing Hegel, regarded him as one of their chief enemies. The book closes with a quote from Carl Schmitt, whom Marcuse terms "the one serious political theorist of National Socialism." Schmitt wrote that on the day of Hitler's ascent to power, "Hegel, so to speak, died" (1941, p. 419). This statement is important today in light of the renewed discussion of Schmitt's political theory.
Marcuse's attack on positivism, along with his defense of Hegel as a revolutionary thinker, subjected his book to severe criticism, especially from the more empirically minded American Marxists and socialists. These scholars consider pragmatism and even positivism as having more in common with Marx's thought than with Hegel's. These attacks persist today, even while the book has become a classic as a major work of Hegelian Marxism.
REVIEWS AND CRITIQUES IN THE 1940s
When Reason and Revolution was first published, the harshest criticism came from the pragmatist Sidney Hook, then still a member of the Marxist left, who went to the trouble of writing two negative reviews. Hook was outraged not only by Marcuse ([1958] 1988, p. 349) , a book to which Marcuse contributed a critical preface, she describes Reason and Revolution as "a truly pioneering and profound work" to which "I would . . . like to acknowledge my debt." Dunayevskaya (1980 Dunayevskaya ( , [1973 1989a; also see Anderson 1986 ) attempts critically to appropriate Hegel's Absolutes, the very category that even other Hegelian Marxists have tended to avoid or dismiss (Bloch [1949] 1962; Lukacs [1948] 1975). To Dunayevskaya, Hegel's Absolutes were not a closed totality but a source of "absolute negativity"; from this source could be constructed a radical concept of dialectics that would expand the traditional Marxist view of the labor movement to include new social movements of blacks, women, and youth. By the 1980s she was connecting these issues increasingly to a subject-centered feminist theory (Dunayevskaya [1982] The correspondence between Dunayevskaya and Marcuse illustrates some of their key differences on Hegelian dialectics as well as on automation and the labor process (Anderson 1989a (Anderson , 1989b (Anderson , 1990 Kellner 1984 Kellner , 1989a Kellner , 1989b .
In 1960 But he himself doesn't attempt to overcome these difficulties. On the contrary, he disregards them, accepting the idea that it is a closed ontology and the best we can do is take this method and use it as a critical theory ([1961] 1981f, p. 2832). 
In her marginal notes to Reason and

